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Abstract
In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n
generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new
expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump-
sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic
labour income taxation. Since the Government has to clear the budget,
some generations obtain a benet, whilst some other must pay the entire
cost of social secutiry systems. I will demonstrate that generations which
are more single-minded on leisure are the most better o¤ since they are
more able to capture politicians in the political competition. Further-
more, it could be the case that candidates are not forced to undertake the
same policies in equilibrium and I will demonstrate that this result holds
only once an endogenous density function for individual preferences for
politicians is considered.
1 Introduction
The e¤ects of income redistribution amongst di¤erent social groups or genera-
tions has always been one of the most important topics in the Public Economics.
The redistribution of income does not involve only considerations on e¢ciency;
also equity must be considerated in the evaluating the goodness of public poli-
cies. Every time a Government passes the budget law, economic analysts and
journalists try to assess which groups are better o¤ and which ones worse o¤.
Since in the economic science the concept of equity is very close to the concept
of fairness and justice, it seems universally accepted that budget laws should
favour the most disadvantaged groups in society and disfavour the more ad-
vantaged. Especially the vertical equity is associated with the idea that people
with a greater ability to pay taxes should pay more. Unfortunatelly, this is only
what a normative approach would suggest. Once we take political economy con-
siderations into account we realize that most of the time, politicians who only
aim to win elections tailor public policies to the most powerful and inuencial
social groups of society. As a consequence, it could be perfectly possible that
the strongest groups are the rich, who usually have more voice. The redistri-
bution of wealth takes place via a redistribution of resources amongst social
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groups; usually the economic literature has considered lump-sum transfers (see
Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin [ ], Lindbeck & Weibull); nevertheless, this redistrib-
ution mechanism does not reect reality where, almost always, social security
programs are nanced via labour income (payroll) taxation (see Diamond [ ]).
Thus, a new kind of budget must be considered, which is based on distortive
taxation. Of course a distortive taxation on labour income produces a distortion
of individuals choices on labour supply, which is also an imperfection for the
labour market. This is for sure a market failure that model based on lump-sum
transfers are not able to catch.
Things worsen once we consider that there is also a political failure that
politicians have to face, which refers to the necessity of favour the strongest
groups in society which prevents the Government to undertake fair policies.
In this paper I will unify both the market and the political failure in one
model.
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 Introduces, section 2 describes
the new redistribution scheme I am going to introduce with respect to the pre-
vious literature, section 3 describes the basic model, section 4 states conditions
for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium, section 5 solve the model
and section 6 concludes.
2 A new redistribution scheme
The core idea of this model is to explain how the early retirement phenomenon
derives from features of social security systems. Nevertheless, social security
systems are not something of exogenously given but are based on passed laws
and, more in general, on the political process. If we consider Leviathan politi-
cians, we must admit that political choices about the social security systems
reect the willingness and preferences of the electorate. Furthermore, in soci-
ety no every group has the same power to capture politicians; there exist some
groups, the single-minded groups, which due to their ability to be focused on
a very few number of issues are able more than others to inuence political
candidates. In this model I will assume that social groups are generations and
the issue they are focuses on is leisure. Hence, workers are perfectly able to
choose their labour supply which is a peculiarity which di¤erentiates my model
from previous models such as Lindbeck & Weibulls (1987), which do not allow
workers for choosing the amount of work and leisure. But preventing this pos-
sibility, the early retirement phenomenon cannot be explained, since the xed
labour supply hypothesis contraddicts the early retirement. Thus a model with
exible labour supply, such as in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) and Profeta
(2002) is required.
This model is also willing to bring something new for what concerns the
redistribution scheme. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin suggest a model where both
the intra-group and the inter-group redistributions are feasible. The former
takes place amongst members of the the same group and it is achieved via a
labour income distortive taxation, whilst the latter takes place amongst di¤erent
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groups via lump-sum transfers. To justify the existence of intra-group transfer,
although memebers of the same cohort are all alike, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
a¢rm that in distorting decisions on labour supply, the elder, which aim to get
more leisure to use a fraction of it in lobbying politicians, are able to solve a
free-riding problem. This problem arises, since every old would like to have more
leisure, but without an incentive to retire nobody voluntarely would retire. As
a consequence, they are more than happy to auto-tax themselves. Otherwise,
Lindbeck and Weibull do not allow for the possibility to redistribute resources
amongst individuals of the same cohort. In both the models, inter-group redis-
tribution takes place according to a lump-sum transfers. With respect to these
two models I do not support the idea by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, since I do
not nd any sense in distorting individual decisions about labour supply, just
in order to redistribute the same (distorted) resources amongst the same (all
alike) individuals. I do not support the idea of inter-group transfer realized via
lump-sum transfers neither, since it is simply unrealistic. In real world social
security programs are nanced mostly via labour income, or payroll, taxation,
according to Diamond (1997). Table 1 syntetizes the main di¤erences amongst
the three models
TABLE 1 HERE
3 The basic model
I consider a model with n overlapping generations. Let I = f   n+ 1; :::; g,
where  n+1 denotes the elder generation and  the younger generation. Each
generation represents a fraction of the population equal to ni, with
nX
i+1
ni = 1.
ni also represents the number of voters of generation i. I assume that there is
no within-generation heterogeneity, which means that all the members within
the same group are alike. Each individual maximizes a quasi-linear function:
U i = C(cit; ) +  
iG(lit; ) (1)
where C represents the actual value of the ow of consumption cit discounted
by a discount factor equal to  = 11+r , and where G is a concave function
(G0 > 0, G00 < 0) which represents the actual value of the ow of leisure lit,
weighted by a parameter  i 2 [0; 1], which denotes an idionsyncratic component
representing preferences of individuals for leisure. This parameter is equal for
every memeber within the same generation. An important assumption is that
this parameter is increasing with respect to age; that is, the elder generations
have a greater level of preferences for leisure than the younger generations. Thus,
  n+1 > ::: >  1. This assumption is supported by both the economic theory
and the empirical evidence, even though a unique consensus on this assumption
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still does not exist.1
The budget constraint which individuals must respect is given by
C(cit; ) = B(w; l
i
t; ; a
i
t;  ; t) (2)
where B represents the actual value of the labour income ow, given by
the net-of-taxes wage rate w(1   e), with e = (1   ait), where w is the wage
rate and e is the e¤ective marginal tax rate given by the nominal marginal tax
rate  and the tax credit ait. Without loss of generality I will assume that the
wage rate is the same for every generation and I will normalize it to the unity.
Individuals have a labour supply equal to t   lit, where t represents the total
endowment of time which must be divided between leisure and work. Hence, at
time t, the labour income of a worker is given by:
w(1  e)(t  lit) (3)
I consider also the existence of a political competition amongst two candi-
dates, say D and R. To quote Buchanan, I will assume that candidates are
Leviathans and only aim to maximize the probability to win elections or, equiv-
alently, the number of votes. They have to choose an optimal vector of policies
 !q = (a n+1t ; :::; a

t ) (4)
Political equilibrium does not change over time, so that there are no di¤er-
ences in calculating the equilibrium in any period of time t. Furthermore, in
maximizing the probability of winning elections, candidates must also respect a
balanced-budget constraint in the Rn space, given by:
nX
i=1
ni(1  e)(t  lit) =
Total tax revenuesz }| {
nX
i=1
tax revenue generation iz }| {
ni(1  (1  ait))(t  l
i
t) (5)
The probability of winning is given by a traditional Probabilistic Voting
Model and, for candidate j, is equal to:
j =
1
2
+
s
d
nX
i=1
nis(lit)
 
V i( !q j)  V i( !q  j)

(6)
where 8i the utility the worker gets from the policy chosen by canditate j,
V i( !q j) is given by the observable component represent by the Indirect Util-
ity Function obtained by the resolution of the maximization problem of the
individual, plus two further components which dene the so-called stochastic
heterogeneity. i represent an idiosyncratic variable which captures the prefer-
ences of individuals for di¤erent candidates; it is uniformly distributed on the
1For a complete review of the literature on individuals preferences for leisure see Canegrati
(2006)
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interval
h
  12s(li) ;
1
2s(li)
i
, with E(i) = 0 and density function equal to s(li). No-
tice that, unlike the traditional PVMs, the density function is endogenous and
monotonically increasing in the level of leisure, meaning that the broadness of
the interval, and thus the tickness of the distribution is a function of leisure; the
higher the leisure, the thicker the distribution or the more compact the group.
This result captures the concept of single-mindedness: those generations which
are more focused or prefer more a single issue (leisure in our case) are more com-
pact in terms of distribution. In gure 1 it is represented an illustrative example
with only three generations which di¤ers for the level of leisure they get (High,
Medium and Low). It can be seen that the distribution of the generation which
get more leisure is ticker than the other two generations which get less leisure.
From candidates point of view, those groups represent the greater threat, since,
due to their particular distribution, they are politically powerful. In gure 2
I depicted the e¤ects of a change in the policy vector chosen by a candidate.
In order to evaluate whether a change in a policy is feasible, a candidate must
count the number of voters is going to gain once the policy has changed and
compare them with the number of voters is going to lose. Of course, he will
be willing to change the policy if and only if the numeber of voters he gains is
greater than the number of voters he loses. Suppose now that he is willing to
adopt a policy which intends to favour the Medium leisure group. The question
is: would the candidate undertake this policy? The answer is no, since even
though the change in the policy enables him to gain voters from the Medium
leisure group (gure 2.b), voters in both High leisure group and in Low leisure
group would be worse o¤ and then they would never vote him (Figure 2.a and
2.c). Since the sum of the number of lost voters is greater than the number
of gained voters, a rational candidate will not undertake the policy. Notice
that the greatest lost in voters is provided by the most single-minded group,
that one which gets the greatest level of leisure. Hence, candidates realize that
single-minded groups are the more powerful and the most able to inuence the
electoral outcome, making di¢cult to allow for the possibility to change a policy
forgetting about these social groups.
The other variable & represents the initial advantage of one of the two candi-
dates; it is not idiosyncratic and it is again uniformly distributed on the interval
  12d ;
1
2d

, with E(&) = 0 and density function equal to d.
A voter votes for candidate D if and only if V i( !q D) > V i( !q R), votes for
candiate R if and only if V i( !q R) > V i( !q D) and toss a coin if V i( !q R) =
V i( !q D). Voters who found in the third case are dened as swing voters, since
they do not have any particular preference for any candidate. A little change in
the policy makes them swing from a candidate to another.
The timing of the game is as follows: in the rst period candidates choose
(and commit to) their optimal policy vectors; thus I do not take dynamic in-
consistency problems into account. Furthermore, no cooperation between can-
didates is allowed. In the second period elections take place. In the rst period
all the workers of each generation choose their optimal leisure. I solve the game
by backwar induction.
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4 Existence and Uniqueness of an equilibrium
First of all I analyse the existence of an equlibrium. From this point of view is
fundamental to consider the existence of uncertainty in the political competition.
Proposition 1 With certainty, j = 2 and i  3 an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. Suppose there exists no party bias and only one individual per genera-
tion. Then, for every proposed policy vector by candidate  j  !q  j , candidate
j may obtain n  1 votes by choosing a vector:
 !q j =

 !q 1 j   "; !q 2 j +
"
n  1
; :::; !q n j +
"
n  1

;8" 2 (0; !q 1 j) (7)
that is subtracting an amount " from one generation (i.e.1) and equally redis-
tribute this amount amongst the other n  1 generations which would be better
o¤ and thus they would vote for him. But this cannot be an equilibrium since
candidate j may choose the following vector:
 !q  j =

 !q 1j   "; !q 2j +
"
n  1
; :::; !q nj +
"
n  1

;8" 2 (0; !q 1j) (8)
. But then again this cannot be an equilibrium since candidate  j would have
an incentive to choose another vector of policies and so on ad innitum.
With uncertainty innitesimal shifts in policies give rise to innitesimal, and
not discrete, shifts in votes;
Proposition 2 In a zero-sum game, if (i) Individual strategy sets are compact
(ii) and convex, (iii) pay-o¤ functions are continuous (iv) and convex, then a
pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium exists.
Proof. (see Rosen, 1965, Th.1 or Owen 1982, Th.IV,6.2)
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), in PVMs
only assumptions (ii) and (iii) are fullled, meaning that the existence of an
equilibrium should be veried case by case.
Proposition 3 If condition A1 holds, then there exists a unique NE of the game
A1: sup
uncertainty thresholdz}|{si0 
si
 inf
concavity indexz }| {
jV i00( !q )j
(V i0( !q ))2
8i
Proof. (see Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987)
Condition A1 states that environments characterized by high levels of uncer-
tainty, the uniqueness of an equilibrium is more likely to be found. In fact if the
lower bound of the set dened by the concavity index measure is not lower than
the upper bound of the set dened by the uncertainty threshold an equilibrium
always exists.
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5 Resolution of the game
In the third stage individuals choose their amount of leisure, solving 1 under 2.
The optimal value is given by:
lit = l( 
i; ait; ) = argmaxU
i (9)
With a log-linear function 9 becomes:
lit =
 i
1  e (10)
Comparative statics shows that
@lit
@ait
=  
 
 i
(1  e)2
!
< 0 (11)
and thus an increase in the tax credits entails a decrease in the optimal level
of leisure.
Substituting 10 in 1 we obtain an expression for the indirect utility function,
which for a log-linear function is equal to
V  n+1t =
income effectz }| {
t((1-) + a n+1t )   
 n+1 + (12)
+  n+1 log  n+1     n+1 log
leisure effect
(
z }| {
(1  ) + a n+1t ) (13)
The question is now, what is the e¤ect of an increase in the optimal tax credit
on the wealth of an individual? Immediately, one may prone to answer that an
increase in the tax credits entails an increase in the utility of the individual, since
the e¤ective marginal tax rate is reduced and the net-of-taxes labour income
increase. But 12 states that this e¤ect (called income e¤ect) is not the only
e¤ect which play a role. The leisure e¤ect says that an increase in the tax
credits reduces leisure, which is something that increases the utility. Thus the
total e¤ect on the welfare on an individual depends on which e¤ect prevails.
Proposition 4 There exists a threshold such that:
8a n+1t < ba n+1t =) @V  n+1t
@a n+1t
< 0 ^ a n+1t > ba n+1t =) @V  n+1t
@a n+1t
> 0
(14)
where ba n+1t  minV n+1t
Proof. Calculate the total di¤erential and obtain
@V  n+1t
@a n+1t
= t  
  n+1
(1  ) + a n+1t
(15)
which entails the existence of a n+1t such that
@Vt n+1
@a
 n+1
t
= 0.
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Proposition 5 In the second stage the political equilibirum is a tie.
Proof. The set of First Order Condition may be written as follows:
ij =
nX
i=1
@sit
@lit
@lit
@ait
 
V i( !q j)  V i( !q  j)

+
nX
i=1
@V it
@ait
sit (16)
i j =
nX
i=1
@sit
@lit
@lit
@ait
 
V i( !q j)  V i( !q  j)

+
nX
i=1
@V it
@ait
sit (17)
and this must be equal for every i. This is because in a PVM Lagrange multi-
pliers represent the per capita marginal gain in expected votes, w.r.t. marginal
shifts in transfers should be equal for all groups. But it is evident that in an
equilibrium this value must be equal for every generation. Suppose not; if so,
the expected number of votes on a party could be improved without violation
of the public budget constraint. This last statements a¢rms that there would
exist an incentive for the candidates to increase transfers towards those groups
which promise a greater increase in the expected number of votes.
Proposition 6 (Policy Convergence) Assume (i)  !q is a convex set, (ii) for
each I and j a is strictly monotonic, (iii) for each j Vi is concave. If (q

j ,q

 j)
is a pure strategy electoral equilibrium, then qj = q

 j.
Proof. see the Mathematical Appendix.
In the rst stage of the game candidates chose the optimal vector of policies.
Proposition 7 A pair of reaction functions for candidate j and -j if policies
are not convergent.
R
j
t (
 !q  j)   !q j = a
 
s(lit ); s(l
 i
t ); n
i; n i; L; t;  
i;   i; !q  j

(18)
R
j
t (
 !q j)   !q  j = a
 
s(lit ); s(l
 i
t ); n
i; n i; L; t;  
i;   i; !q j

(19)
Write the rst order conditions in explicit form for both the candidates and
notice that in the case of policy convergence
Proposition 8 If policies are convergent then reaction functions are indepen-
dent from the policy chosen by the other candidate; that is V i( !q j) = V i( !q  j).
Proof. Equations 21 and 22 reduce to:
ij =
nX
i=1
@V it
@ait
sit (20)
i j =
nX
i=1
@V it
@ait
sit (21)
which are of course independent from the other candidates policy vector.
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Proposition 9 Optimal tax credits are a function of the number and density
of both groups, of the marginal tax rate, of the total endowment of time and of
the parameters representing preferences of groups for leisure:
ait = a
 
s(lit ); s(l
 i
t ); n
i; n i; L; t;  
i;   i

(22)
Proof. Solve the system of equations 20 and 21.
6 Conclusions
7 Mathematical Appendix
From Proposition 5 we know that j and  j must be equal for every i. This
entails that the ratio between the two Lagrange multiplier of the di¤erent can-
didates must be equal for every i. We call this ratio as
i =
ji
 ji
=
nX
i=1
@si
@li
@li
@aij
 
V i( !q j)  V i( !q  j)

+
nX
i=1
@V it
@aij
sit
nX
i=1
@sit
@lit
@lit
@ait
(V i( !q  j)  V i( !q j)) +
nX
i=1
@V it
@a
i j
t
sit
(23)
The problem now is to evaluate whether this condition may be achieve un-
der a policy di¤erentiation or may only be achieved under a policy convergence.
To prove this, we start assuming that candidates chose di¤erent policy vec-
tors, that is  !q j =  !q  j . Since candidates must also clear the balanced-budget
constraint, there must exist a set of generations which get higher tax credits
under candidate j than under candidate  j and I will denote this set with
I+ = fi 2 Ijaj+ > a j+g and a set of generations which get higher tax credits
under candidate  j than under candidate j, I  = fi 2 Ijaj  > a j g. We
have to evaluate if + =  . If we verify that this is true, it will mean that an
equilibrium may be achieved via di¤erent policies; otherwise, we must conclude
that the only possibility to achieve the equilibrium is via convergent policies.
The problem becomes to nd a monotonicity condition on both the numerator
and the denominator. If so, then it would mean that either  !q j > 1 >  !q  j or
 !q j < 1 <  !q  j and thus an equilibrium cannot never be achieved via di¤erent
policies.
The simplest tecnique is to impose the ratio equal to one, subtract the de-
nominator from the numerator and see whether a monotonicity is reached. De-
noting z = V i( !q j)  V i( !q  j) expressions we get are the following:
nX
i=1
@s+
@aj+
z  
nX
i=1
@s+
@a j+
z +
 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
!
s+ (24)
for groups +, and
9
nX
i=1
@s 
@a j 
z  
nX
i=1
@s 
@aj 
z +
 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
!
s+ (25)
for groups -.
Now the sign of z changes according to the interval where tax credits nd.
Denoting with a
V=0+ and aV=0 points where the IUF intersects the axis (re-
spectively at the right and at the left hand side) representing the tax credit we
may easily see that we have to study 6 cases:
a j+ < aj+ < aV=0 =) z < 0 (26)
a j+ < aV=0 < a
j+ < ba =) z < 0 (27)
aV=0 < a
 j+ < aj+ < ba =) z > 0 (28)
aV=0 < a
 j+ < ba < aj+ < aV (aj)<V (a j) =) z > 0 (29)
aV=0+ < a
 j+ < ba < aV (aj)<V (a j) < aj+ < aV=0  =) z > 0 (30)
aV=0+ < a
 j+ < ba < aV (aj)<V (a j) < aV=0  < aj+ =) z > 0 (31)
As a consequence we may study the sign of expression...
First case:
>0z }| {
I+X
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@aj+
<0z}|{
z  
nX
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@a j+
>0
( z) +
<0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (32)
<0z }| {
I X
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@a j 
>0z}|{
( z) 
nX
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@aj 
<0z}|{
z +
>0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (33)
Second case:
>0z }| {
I+X
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@aj+
<0z}|{
z  
nX
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@a j+
>0
( z) +
<0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (34)
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<0z }| {
I X
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s-
@a j 
>0z}|{
( z) 
nX
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s-
@aj 
<0z}|{
z +
>0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V+
@aj+
 
@V+
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (35)
In this case it easy to see that we have not found a monotonicity condition
and thus it could exist an equilibrium achieved via a di¤erentiation of policies.
Third case:
<0z }| {
I+X
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@aj+
>0z}|{
z  
nX
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@a j+
<0
( z) +
<0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (36)
>0z }| {
I X
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@a j 
<0z}|{
( z) 
nX
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@aj 
>0z}|{
z +
>0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (37)
Fourth case:
<0z }| {
I+X
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@aj+
>0z}|{
z  
nX
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@a j+
<0
( z) +
>0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (38)
>0z }| {
I X
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@a j 
<0z}|{
( z) 
nX
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@aj 
>0z}|{
z +
<0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (39)
Fifth case:
>0z }| {
I+X
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@aj+
<0z}|{
z  
nX
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@a j+
>0
( z) +
>0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (40)
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<0z }| {
I X
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@a j 
>0z}|{
( z) 
nX
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@aj 
<0z}|{
z +
<0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (41)
Sixth case:
<0z }| {
I+X
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@aj+
>0z}|{
z  
nX
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s+
@a j+
<0
( z) +
>0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (42)
>0z }| {
I X
i=1
>0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@a j 
<0z}|{
( z) 
nX
i=1
<0z }| {
<0z }| {
@s 
@aj 
>0z}|{
z +
<0z }| { 
nX
i=1
@V +
@aj+
 
@V +
@a j+
! >0z}|{
s+ (43)
Hence, a strict monotonicity condition was found only in the third and fth
case, meaning that + 6=   and thus an equilibrium is only possible to achieve
under policy convergence.
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 Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin Lindbeck & Weibull  Canegrati 
Political Competition No Yes Yes 
Intra-generational redistribution Labour-income taxation No No 
Inter-generational redistribution Lump-Sum Lump-sum Labour-income taxation 
Labour Supply Variable Fixed Variable 
Early-retirement Yes No Yes 
Table 1 
